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Flaws attackers are using, and what CERT-In said

Most vulnerability lists tell you a flaw exists. One tells you it is already being used: CISA adds a flaw to its catalogue only once exploitation is confirmed. This page tracks that list, and checks each flaw against CERT-In’s own vulnerability notes to see what an organisation in India would have been told.

Confirmed as used in attacks this week

Added to CISA’s exploited list in the last seven days, newest first, with whether CERT-In has a note naming the same CVE. If you are deciding what to patch, start here.

SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPNNot in our archiveCVE-2026-19868 · confirmed 6 Nov 2026
Apple (several products)CERT-In noteCVE-2024-27834 · confirmed 4 Nov 2026 · CIAD-2024-0027
WordPress CoreNot in our archiveCVE-2026-119977 · confirmed 3 Nov 2026

How much of it CERT-In wrote about

Over 1 Jan 2022 to 6 Nov 2026, the span where our copy of CERT-In’s note archive has no gaps, CISA confirmed 849 flaws from those same years as being used in attacks. CERT-In had published a note or advisory naming the same CVE for 485 of them.

849flaws confirmed as used in attacks in this span
485also named in a CERT-In vulnerability note (57%)
364not named in one, so watching CERT-In alone would not surface them

A gap is expected rather than a failure, because the two lists are made for different purposes. CERT-In writes when a vendor publishes a fix, which is usually before anyone has confirmed the flaw is being exploited, and it does not reissue the note later when exploitation is confirmed. The practical reading is that neither list contains the other, so defenders in India have reason to watch both.

How quickly CERT-In acted

For the 485 flaws on both lists in that span, how long after exploitation was confirmed did CERT-In’s note appear? A negative number means the note already existed.

+1days, the middle gap between the two dates
181of 485 notes were already published when exploitation was confirmed
334of 485 landed within a week either side
Note 30+ days earlier
72
8 to 29 days earlier
31
Within a week either way
334
8 to 29 days later
32
30 days later or more
16

Read these as counts over one measured span, not as a service level: CERT-In is writing when a vendor ships a fix, so a note that arrives first is the ordinary case rather than a prediction of exploitation. The slow tail matters more than the average, because those are the flaws already in use with nothing yet published in India.

Year by year

YearConfirmed exploitedWith a CERT-In noteMiddle gapNote came first
2026256153 (59%)+1 days51
202520797 (46%)+1 days27
202415078 (52%)+1 days33
202314590 (62%)+0 days39
20229167 (73%)+0 days31

Only years whose note archive has no gaps appear here, so the table fills in as the archive is completed.

Whose software

Vendors appearing most often among flaws confirmed as exploited, 10 Jan 2022 to 6 Nov 2026.

Microsoft307Cisco91Adobe78Apple73Google53Oracle39Linux31Apache29Ivanti29Fortinet28D-Link24Citrix21

277 of the 1458 flaws in this period are recorded as having been used in ransomware campaigns.

Method and sources

Flaws are joined to notes by CVE number only, so a note describing the same flaw without printing its CVE number counts as no match: the overlap shown is a floor. Both CERT-In series are counted: CIVN vulnerability notes and CIAD advisories. The comparison covers only flaws whose CVE was assigned in a year the archive holds, because CISA opened its catalogue in November 2021 by listing hundreds of far older flaws and still adds the occasional veteran; a CVE from 2017 has a CERT-In note from 2017, outside the archive, and counting it as uncovered would measure where our archive begins rather than anything CERT-In did. We hold 2177 CERT-In notes, which is part of the year, so the comparison above is confined to 1 Jan 2022 to 6 Nov 2026 and will widen as the archive fills. Counts are of flaws and vendors; no organisation, customer or victim is named anywhere on this page. Rebuilt weekly.